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POLICYCHALLENGE
Theglobalharmonisationofallaspectsoffinancialregulationcannotbe
achieved.Manyelementsoffinancialstabilityandcustomer-protectionpol-
icycanbedeterminedlocally.Somecompetitivedistortionsandopportuni-
tiesforregulatoryarbitragewillremaininevitable.Butactionisneededat
globalleveltopreventdamagingfragmentationofcapitalmarkets.Policy
makersshouldprioritisefourkeycomponents:(1)buildingstrongerglobal
publicinstitutions,togeta
comprehensiveanalyticalpic-
ture,setauthoritativestan-
dards,andfosterandmonitor
theconsistencyofregulatory
practice;(2)globallyconsis-
tentfinancialinformation;(3)
agloballyintegratedcapital-
marketsinfrastructure;and
(4)addressingcompetitive
distortionsamong globalcap-
ital-marketintermediaries.
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SUMMARYThefinancialcrisishasintensifiedthefocusonfinancialregula-
tionatgloballevel,placingitatthetopoftheG20agenda.However,global
convergenceismademoredifficultbyfinancialmultipolarity,meaningthe
riseofemergingeconomiesanditsimpactondecision-makingatglobal
level,andfinancialreregulation,orthetrendtowardsstrongerregulationof
financialsystemstobuttressfinancialstability,particularlyindeveloped
economies.Asaresult,theambitiousobjectivesinitiallysetbyglobal
leadershavesofarnotbeenturnedintomajorinternationalbreak-
throughs,andcontinuedglobalcapital-marketintegrationcannolongerbe
takenforgranted.
Sumofscoresoneffectiveness,cross-borderconsistencyandfollow-up
sortedbyleadinginstitutionincharge.SeeFig.2onpage5fordetails.b
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NOTALLFINANCIALREGULATIONISGLOBAL
1. 1.Creditisdueto
MichaelGadbawforthis
useofthelateUSpoliti-
cianTipO’Neill’sprover-
bialsayingonpolitics.
2.TheG10,established
in1962,iscomposed
ofBelgium,Canada,
France,Germany,Italy,
Japan,theNetherlands,
Sweden,theUK,theUS,
aswellasSwitzerland
whichformallyjoinedin
1983.
3.TheUSisthemain
outlier.Japanhasnot
madeIFRSmandatory,
butallowscompanies
tousetheminsteadof
nationalstandards.
4.Thisprogrammeis
jointlyoperatedwith
theWorldBankwhen
appliedtodeveloping
countries.
AS THE SAYING GOES, ‘all politics is
local’,butequally‘alleconomicsis
global’ and regulation is one arena
in which they meet and conflict
1.
This has been particularly true for
financial regulation in the wake of
theunprecedentedfinancialcrisis.
Financial regulation has been her-
aldedasatopprioritybythenewly
prominent G20. But almost two
yearsonthefeelingprevails,espe-
cially in Europe, that the results
havenotmatchedtheinitialambi-
tion. This warrants a reconsidera-
tion of the global financial
regulatoryagenda.Allthingsbeing
equal, consistent regulatory
choices across the globe are
preferable, but achieving consis-
tency involves difficult political
andeconomictrade-offs.
1 THERISEOFGLOBALFINANCIAL
REGULATION
‘Financial regulation’ commonly
indicates a cluster of interrelated
policies designed to ensure the
proper functioning and the
integrity of the financial system,
including public regulation and
supervision of bank capital, lever-
age, liquidity and risk manage-
ment; control of moral hazard and
financial industry incentives; cus-
tomerprotection;andregulationof
capital markets. Capital-flow con-
trols, prevention of money laun-
dering and taxation of financial
activities can overlap with this
agenda but are not in a strict
senseaboutfinancialregulation.
Until the 1970s, financial regula-
tion developed almost exclusively
at national level. In 1974, the
international ripple effects of the
bankruptcy of Germany’s Herstatt
Bank led to the formation by the
G10CentralBankGovernors
2
ofthe
Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) hosted by the
BankforInternationalSettlements
(BIS, established 1931). In the
1980s, as the savings and loan
crisis led to tighter capital regula-
tion in the US, American banks
successfully argued that equiva-
lent regulation should be imposed
on banks in other jurisdictions,
especiallyJapan.Thusin1988the
BCBS produced the first Basel
Capital Accord. Risk weighting
under this agreement was subse-
quently deemed too crude to be
effective, and in 2004 the BCBS
produced a new accord known as
BaselII.
Separately, a global financial
reporting and auditing framework
emerged,atfirstattheinitiativeof
the private-sector accounting pro-
fession through the International
Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC) in 1973 and the
International Federation of
Accountants (IFAC) in 1977. The
IASC was made independent from
professional bodies in 2001 and
renamed the International
Accounting Standards Board
(IASB). Many countries have
agreed to adopt the IASB’s
International Financial Reporting
Standards(IFRS)followingthepio-
neering decision of the European
Unionin2000-02
3.
Securitiesregulatorscoordinateat
the global level through the
International Organisation of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
created in 1983 from a pre-exist-
ing pan-American regional associ-
ation formed in 1974. Insurance
oversight is discussed within the
International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS),
established in 1994. Public-sector
audit supervisors, set up in the US
and elsewhere after accounting
scandals including the Enron col-
lapse in the early 2000s, estab-
lished the International Forum of
Independent Audit Regulators
(IFIAR)in2006.
Beyond these sector-specific ini-
tiatives, the late-1990s emerging-
marketcrisesprovedthatvulnera-
ble financial firms could cause
international macroeconomic
instability. In response, finance
ministers and central bankers
from developed and developing
countries met in different forums,
successivelytheG22(1998),G33
(early 1999) and eventually the
G20 (late 1999). Simultaneously,
developed countries established
the Financial Stability Forum
(FSF) to enhance their coordina-
tion and foster global standards.
Also in 1999, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) was tasked
withassessingnationalregulatory
and supervisory frameworks
through the Financial Sector
AssessmentProgram(FSAP)
4.
The present crisis has further
enhanced the status of financial
regulation from a technical issue
dealtwithbyspecialisedbodiesto
a matter of relevance for political
leaders. The G7/G8, meeting since
the 1970s, tended to focus onTable1:Majorcrisesandinternationalfinancialregulatoryinitiatives
Firstworldwar/Germanreparations BIS 1931
GreatDepression/secondworldwar/post-
warreconstruction IMF,WorldBank,OECD 1945-48
HerstattBankfailure BCBS 1974
Latin-Americancrisis/
savingsandloancrisis BaselCapitalAccord 1988
Transitioninex-communistcountries EBRD
5 1991
Asianfinancialcrisis FSF,FSAP,G20 1999
Enron/variousaccountingscandals IFIAR 2006
Currentcrisis G20Summits,FSB 2008-09
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5.EuropeanBankfor
Reconstructionand
Development
international macroeconomics
and trade, but G20 summits since
2008 have looked extensively at
financialregulation,whichwasthe
focus of no fewer than 39 out of
the 47 action points in the first
G20 summit declaration
(November 2008). In April 2009,
G20 leaders extended the FSF to
major emerging economies, and
renamed it the Financial Stability
Board (FSB). The memberships of
the BCBS and other Basel-based
committeeswerealsoextendedto
includeallG20countries.
Because financial regulation only
recently became a major interna-
tional economic-policy issue, the
corresponding conceptual and
analytical foundation is less solid
than for, say, trade and interna-
tional macroeconomics, which
have been topics of intense eco-
nomic research and negotiation
fordecades.
The substantial body of literature
on financial markets and interme-
diaries has long been only tenu-
ously linked to mainstream
economics. The impact of many
regulatory issues on specific mar-
ket participants has also made
this policy area prone to various
forms of private-sector capture.
Consequently, while it has gained
great prominence, financial regu-
lation remains a comparatively
immature component of interna-
tionaleconomicpolicy.
2 THENEWCONTEXT:MULTI-
POLARITYANDREREGULATION
Policyoutcomeswillbeshapedby
two major shifts, which we may
call financial multipolarity and
reregulation.Thefirstpredatesthe
crisis but was arguably reinforced
by it, while the second is a direct
consequenceofit.
By financial multipolarity we
mean that the geography of global
finance is rapidly evolving from a
mainly North-Atlantic focus
towards a much broader canvas.
Notwithstanding the 1980s bub-
ble in Japan, the joint dominance
of the US and Europe in financial
matters has long looked resilient,
in spite of the rapid catch-up
growth of emerging economies.
But the centre of gravity of global
finance is now moving eastward.
Among the world’s 100 largest
listed banks by market
capitalisation, the share of emerg-
ing markets has surged from
almost none to more than a third,
more than either the US or Europe
(Figure 1), part of which is
explainedbytheextraordinaryrise
in value of major Chinese banks
since their initial public offerings
in 2005-06. Even though their
international activity remains lim-
ited for the moment, these new
entrantsrepresentamajorchange
inthegloballandscape.
Looking at global financial centres
rather than firms, a similar picture
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Figure1:Global100largestlistedbanks,distribution1996-2010muchfinancialbusinessremained
highlyregulated,therewasatrend
towardsliberalisationandreliance
on market discipline during the
twodecadesthatprecededthecri-
sis. The new trend does not mean
that no financial activities will
escape regulation in the years
ahead, but it is nevertheless mak-
ing its impact felt and is attracting
solid cross-partisan political con-
sensus in most major developed
economies.
3 LIMITSANDPRIORITIESOF
INTERNATIONALCOLLECTIVE
ACTION
The consequences of financial
multipolarity and reregulation
may be more profound and wide-
ranging than has often been
acknowledged. They make global
financial regulatory harmonisa-
tion a more distant prospect than
wasthecasebeforethecrisis.Itis
easier to harmonise when there is
hegemony of one country or one
bloc than when many diverging
voices need to concur for a deci-
siontobemade.Itisalsoeasierto
harmoniserulesinaneraofdereg-
ulation, by reaching agreement on
a low common denominator, than
whenexpectationsareraisedasto
what the rules should achieve and
theseexpectationsdifferfromone
jurisdictiontoanother.
Today’s multipolar financial world
is one in which levels of financial
development vary hugely. As a
consequence, not only do prefer-
ences differ but governments’
interest in financial regulation,
and technical capacity to discuss
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6.Unfortunately,both
rankingswereintro-
ducedtoorecentlytobe
usedtoanalyse
mid-termtrends.
7.Seeforexample
GrahamBowleyandEric
Dash,‘WallSt.Faces
SpecterofLost
TradingUnits’,
TheNewYorkTimes,
6August2010
8.PatrickFoulis,‘They
MightBeGiants:Special
ReportonBankingin
EmergingMarkets’,
TheEconomist,
15May2010
9.Seeforexample,‘A
HundredSmallSteps:
ReportoftheCommittee
onFinancialSector
Reform’,headedby
RaghuramRajan,
GovernmentofIndia
PlanningCommission,
2009
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emerges: Table 2 showsthat Asian
centres are hot on the heels of
London and New York in the global
pecking order.
6To chase high sav-
ings and sovereign wealth, asset
management teams, which a
decade ago would have chosen
London or New York as their obvi-
ous location, increasingly base
themselvesinDubai,HongKongor
Singapore. Over the next decade,
thecombinationofdeleveragingin
the West and continued financial
development in emerging
economies will certainly reinforce
the trend towards multipolarity,
with a resulting shift of power in
the global financial policy debate,
even if emerging countries have
been discreet in these so far. An
additional factor is that the crisis
has dented what previously
seemed to be western intellectual
leadershipinfinancialmatters.
Financial reregulation refers to
the heightened concern of policy-
makers in developed economies
aboutfinancialstability,andcorre-
sponding disillusionment about
the economic benefits of unfet-
teredfinance,leadingthemtocon-
strainthefinancialindustryinnew
ways. For example, the US Dodd-
Frank Act of July 2010 introduces
significantchangesinmanyareas
and contrary to most suggestions
from the financial industry
7. The
EU has similarly initiated new
financial legislation. In emerging
economies, finance is typically
more tightly regulated, and in
many cases largely or almost
totally state-owned
8. Several such
countries may in the years to
comemovetowardsfurtherliberal-
isationoftheirfinancialsystemto
boost credit development and
growth
9. But this is unlikely to
hamper the drive towards reregu-
lation in richer economies with a
high level of financial develop-
ment.
Reregulation should not be seen
asasudden,across-the-boardpar-
adigm change, but rather as a
long-term trend reversal. While
Table2:Twoleaguetablesofglobalfinancialcentres
InternationalFinancialCentres
DevelopmentIndex
GlobalFinancialCentresIndex
NewYork 88.4 London 775
London 87.7 NewYork 775
Tokyo 85.6 HongKong 739
HongKong 81.0 Singapore 733
Paris 72.8 Tokyo 692
Singapore 70.1 Chicago 678
Frankfurt 64.4 Zurich 677
Shanghai 63.8 Geneva 671
Washington 61.1 Shenzhen 670
Sydney 59.5 Sydney 670
Source:Xinhua-DowJonesIFCDIndex,July2010;Z/YenandCityofLondon,7thGlobal
FinancialCentresReport,March2010.it, are also unequal. In certain
cases, authoritarianism or a fierce
commitment to sovereignty may
limit the scope of global agree-
ment.Bythesametoken,multipo-
larity means that the range of
regulatory issues on which devel-
oped countries can negotiate an
agreement and then impose it
upon the rest of the world is dwin-
dling rapidly. These limitations are
likely to become increasingly visi-
ble in the next few years. In the
current context, harmonisation
efforts might only lead to weak
globalstandards,necessarilycom-
plemented by tougher rules in
countries with higher regulatory
expectations.
The shift to reregulation also
transforms the position of several
actors, and especially the EU. In
thepreviousphase,EUinstitutions
were instinctively internationalist,
asglobalinitiativescouldbeeffec-
tive drivers of intra-EU harmonisa-
tion. The adoption of IFRS in
2000-02 is a quintessential case.
It enabled unification of account-
ing standards throughout the EU,
where previous EU-only efforts to
achievethataimviadirectiveshad
failed.Butnow,suchdynamicsare
becoming unlikely as more EU-
specificpoliticalobjectivesarefed
into the regulations. This is illus-
trated by growing tensions
between the EU and the IASB
(which themselves dampen the
prospects of IFRS adoption in the
US), but also by other cases such
as the Alternative Investment
Fund Managers Directive propos-
als. Reregulation is making the EU
more unilateralist, as the US has
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beenforalongtime.
Thecombinationoffinancialmulti-
polarity and reregulation also
reduces the relative effectiveness
and increases the complexity of
soft coordination, which in turn
gives more salience to formal,
often legally grounded processes.
The high level of voluntary cooper-
ation among central banks
throughout the crisis provides a
counterexample,butuniquespeci-
ficities of central banking mean
this cannot provide a template for
regulatorypolicy.
Figure 2 scores the 39 financial
regulation action items in the first
G20 summit declaration. For each
item, we have graded effective-
nessofimplementation,cross-bor-
der consistency and follow-up
initiatives until now. The analysis
shows that the more the imple-
mentation of the action item
depends on action by an interna-
tionalbodywithsignificant auton-
omy in administration and
resources, the more effective the
implementation.
Given the reluctance to delegate
formalpowerstothesupranational
level, accentuated by differences
of financial-industry structures
across jurisdictions (such as the
dominance of universal banks in
the EU, state-owned banks in
developing countries, and differ-
ences between common-law and
civil-lawsystems),globalfinancial
regulationwillbeunabletoprovide
a seamlessly integrated, global
level playing field in which all
financial intermediaries can com-
pete fairly on all markets, inde-
pendently of their country of
origin. From this perspective, it
should not be a surprise if the
eventual outcome of the ‘Basel III’
discussion, due in November
2010, is not deemed demanding
enough to meet the reregulation
requirements of several key coun-
tries (possibly including the US,
UKandSwitzerland)inspiteofthe
achievement of concluding such a
National authorities
(8 items)
FSB
(8 items)
BCBS, IASB,IOSCO
(19 items)
IMF
(6 items)
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Effectiveness(max. 5)
Cross-border consistency(max. 3)
Follow-up(max. 2)
Totalscore(max. 10)
ThedataandmethodologyaredetailedinStéphaneRottierandNicolasVéron,‘AnAssessmentof
theG20’sInitialActionItems’,BruegelPolicyContribution2010/08,availableonwww.bruegel.org.
Figure2:Scoringofimplementationoffinancialregulationaction
pointsintheNovember2008G20Declaration,
bytypeofmaindecision-makinginstitutioncomplex agreement in a fairly lim-
ited timeframe. Similarly, meas-
ures to tackle the moral hazard
inherentinsystemicallyimportant
financialinstitutions,onwhichthe
FSBistoproduceareportlaterthis
year,andmoregenerallyrulesthat
shape the structure of the finan-
cial industry, such as the ‘Volcker
Rule’ in the US, will predominantly
belong to the national (or EU)
level.
Fortunately, many aspects of
financial stability policy can be
effectively tackled at local level,
and diversity of approaches can
even be beneficial. As Figure 3
illustrates, the international activ-
ity of large banks is typically less
than one-quarter of the total. The
main exception is the EU, where a
high level of cross-border integra-
tion and the commitment to a sin-
gle market call for a strong
supranational supervisory frame-
work, which is currently being dis-
cussed. But elsewhere, even
multinational groups do not
require internationally uniform
supervision. The likes of HSBC or
Santander illustrate that interna-
tionalsynergiescanarisefromthe
leverage of technological prowess
or consumer service know-how,
even with locally capitalised and
funded retail subsidiaries that are
subject to disparate supervisory
standards. As for cross-border
retail branches, they are a gener-
ally disappearing species follow-
ingtheIcelandicexperience.
However, some crucial regulatory
concernscanonlybeaddressedat
global level. Without adequate
global collective action, there is a
riskoffragmentationofglobalcap-
ital markets. The economic bene-
fits of global financial integration
have been questioned in the case
of developing economies
10. The
Asian crisis in particular has led
international financial institutions
to step back from advocating
unlimitedopennesstoforeigncap-
ital flows
11. But for developed
economies, and increasingly for
emergingeconomiesaswell,there
is wide agreement among econo-
miststhatthecross-bordercapital
market integration has a signifi-
cantpositiveimpactongrowth,by
broadening the pool of investors
that capital-hungry economic
actorscantapinto,andconversely
by broadening the range of invest-
ment opportunities for capital
providers
12.
In other terms, and with due quali-
fication, financial integration is a
global public good whose benefits
maybeatriskinaneraoffinancial
multipolarity and reregulation.
Reregulation enhances the risk of
mutually incompatible policies
leading to market fragmentation,
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10.Seeforexample
DaniRodrikandArvind
Subramaniam,‘Whydid
FinancialGlobalization
Disappoint?’,IMFStaff
Papers56:112-138,
January2009
11. International
MonetaryFund,
‘RepeaingtheBenefits
ofFinancial
Globalization’,discus-
sionpaperpreparedby
theResearch
Department,June2007
12. SeeWilliamCline,
FinancialGlobalization,
EconomicGrowth,and
theCrisisof2007-09,
PetersonInstitute
forInternational
Economics,May2010,
foradevelopmentof
thisargumentand
extensiveliterature
review.
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Averagedistributionoftotal2009revenue.Source:corporatereports;authors’calculations.
MauricioNakahodo’sresearchassistanceisgratefullyacknowledged.
Figure3:Internationalisationoflargestlistedbanks,
selectedjurisdictions
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Figure4:Netprivatefinancialflowstoemergingand
developingcountriesand no single power can exert suf-
ficient leadership, benevolent or
otherwise, for consistency to be
ensured. The crisis itself has
stalled the growth of cross-border
financial flows to emerging coun-
tries, as Figure 4 illustrates.
Available data suggest that the
sameistrueofglobalcapitalflows
moregenerally
13.
4 APRACTICALAGENDAFOR
GLOBALCAPITALMARKETS
To ensure the sustainability of
financial integration, four compo-
nentsareessential.
The first is stronger global public
institutions. The current environ-
ment makes this difficult to
achieve, but at the same time
more necessary as the potential
for effective voluntary coordina-
tioniseroded.Globalpublicinstitu-
tions help to provide a
comprehensive analytical picture,
set authoritative standards, and
foster and monitor consistency of
regulatory practice. Policymakers
should build on existing bodies
wherever possible, but where suit-
able bodies are unavailable, they
must also be ready to create new
ones. The G20 has a major role to
play in empowering such institu-
tions and granting them wide
acceptance, but it cannot claim to
represent all countries, and is
boundtofailifittriestomicroman-
age individual topics. The overall
geography of global public bodies,
whose symbolic but also practical
impact cannot be overstated,
should be rebalanced, perhaps by
relocating one of the Bretton
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13.SeeMcKinsey
GlobalInstitute,‘Global
CapitalMarkets:
EnteringaNewEra’,
September2009
14.Thesepointswillbe
furtherdevelopedina
forthcomingBruegel
publicationon
accountingpolicy.
15.Beforethecrisis,
onlytheUSandafew
otherjurisdictionssuch
asArgentina,Mexico
andSouthKoreafor-
mallyregulatedand
supervisedcreditrating
agencies.Now
Australia,theEU,India
andJapanhaveintro-
ducedregulationinthis
area,andseveral oth-
ersareintheprocess
ofdoingso.
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WoodsinstitutionstoAsia.Keypil-
lars of a global financial body’s
strength include: a transparent
governanceframeworkthatclearly
setsoutitsmission,properlyiden-
tifies its stakeholders, and makes
it accountable to them; adequate
and stable financial and human
resources,avoidingfundingmech-
anisms that could be leveraged by
special interests to compromise
the body’s independence; suffi-
cient access to relevant informa-
tion, for which formal
commitments by national or
regional authorities may often be
indispensible; and practice that is
consistent with its proclaimed
aims. Specific recommendations
along these lines are outlined in
thefollowingparagraphs.
Second,globallyconsistentfinan-
cial information is crucial. To start
with, the IASB needs a sustainable
strategy and governance model to
attract more trust from its stake-
holders, especially investors
which are the primary users of
financial reporting. Instead of hav-
ing each of its standards made
mandatory everywhere, an overly
ambitious aim in the short term, it
shouldinsist on universalrecogni-
tion of voluntary IFRS adoption by
those issuers which desire it. It
should also monitor better how
IFRS are applied, in liaison with
local authorities. Such measures
are needed to prevent the risk of
this unique experiment in global
standard-settingbeingderailed
14.
Equallyimportantistoensurebet-
ter consistency of audits.
Currently,auditfirmsareonlyreg-
ulatedatnationallevel;IFIARdoes
not even have a permanent secre-
tariat. The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 attempted to grant US
audit oversight authorities an
extraterritorial mandate, but this
has not been accepted interna-
tionally. The creation of a new
globalbody(ordramaticstepping-
up of IFIAR’s status) may be
needed in the future to underpin
the global integrity of audit
processes.
Public information on financial
risks should be enhanced, espe-
cially for financial-sector firms.
Current risk-disclosure frame-
works, whether as part of IFRS or
BaselII(‘thirdpillar’),haveproved
insufficient, and the malfunction
of credit-rating agencies in
assessingstructuredproductshas
compounded the problem. The
publication of ‘stress-test’ results
intheUS(May2009)andEU(July
2010)waslinkedtothecrisisand
may not be made a regular
process,butregulatorsmustfinda
way to bring lasting improvement
to financial risk disclosure.
Additionally, the public supervi-
sion of rating agencies, which is
spreadingatarapidpace
15,should
be strongly coordinated at global
level in order to safeguard the
global consistency of rating
methodologies.
Atanaggregatelevel,thedegreeof
internationally comparable infor-
mation currently available to the
public on financial systems and
markets, including disclosures on
government finances and their
support to financial firms, is
entirely insufficient. It must beb
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increased. Governmentsandsupervi-
sorsshouldmakeacredible commit-
ment to provide much more
detailed, reliable and frequent
information, to be pooled at global
levelbytheIMFand/ortheBISand
tobemadepubliclyavailableinan
appropriateform.
Third, new arrangements are
needed to enable and adequately
supervisegloballyintegratedcap-
ital-market infrastructure. The
‘plumbing’thatunderpinsmarkets
for securities and derivatives is a
big determinant of cross-border
integration. Most prominently, the
newtrendtohaveover-the-counter
derivatives cleared by central
counterparties, or even migrated
to organised trading platforms, is
tobewelcomedbutalsoincreases
the risk of fragmentation along
geographical or currency lines of
markets that until now had
achieved global scale. Central
counterparties are systemically
important and quintessentially
‘too-big-to-fail’ financial institu-
tions,whichraisesthequestionof
how some form of fiscal backstop
couldbeputinplaceiftheirsuper-
vision were to be transferred to
supranational level. However, this
is an area where ex-ante burden-
sharing, or a formal agreement by
allormostjurisdictionsconcerned
on how to apportion the cost of an
international bail-out, is easier to
envisage than in the case of
banks, given the relatively
straightforward nature of the
activity. Therefore, global or supra-
national supervision may come
earlier to clearing (and perhaps
trading) platforms than to cross-
borderbanks.Itisalsoanarguably
more pressing need, given these
players’ central role in shaping
globalmarketintegration.
Fourth,capitalmarketsintermedi-
aries require a global playing
field. We argued in the previous
section that retail banking regula-
tion can largely be tackled by indi-
vidual jurisdictions. However, the
activity of investment banks and
of many non-bank capital markets
intermediaries tends to be more
globallyintegrated,whichisbound
to create tensions in a world in
which supervision is reinforced
but remains far from internation-
ally consistent. Recovery and res-
olution plans, or ‘living wills’, are a
novel idea to ensure orderly man-
agement of failing globally inte-
grated financial institutions, but
they may increase fragmentation
in the absence of an international
resolution authority. Moreover,
investment banking arms of uni-
versal banks from large countries
benefitfromthegovernmentguar-
antee on their home-country
deposits and access to central-
bankfundingtoanextentunavail-
able to competitors from small
countries,whichmaybe‘toobigto
save’ given limited fiscal capacity
at home, and to pure-play invest-
ment banks, which do not have
access to such guaranteed fund-
ing.Thereisnoobvioussolutionto
hand, and we may have to live for
some time with serious competi-
tive distortions, with players from
smallercountriesbeingplacedata
structural disadvantage. More dis-
cussion is needed on these chal-
lenges. A stronger international
competition policy framework
may be part of the answer to fight
damaging economic nationalism
by governments as well as preda-
torybehaviourbyintermediaries.
Allinall,thefutureglobalfinancial
regulatorylandscapeismorelikely
to resemble a Japanese garden,
with new details and perspectives
emergingateachstep,thanacen-
tralised and symmetrical jardin à
la française. Consistency will not
be uniformly achieved, the bound-
ary between global and local deci-
sion-makingwillremaininfluxand
controversial,andaspiritofexper-
imentationandinstitutionalentre-
preneurship will be required. As
Francis Fukuyama, a political sci-
entist,putitinalecturein2005at
YaleUniversity,‘creatingnewinsti-
tutionsthatwillbetterbalancethe
requirements of legitimacy and
effectiveness will be the prime
task for the coming generation’
16.
This general statement certainly
appliestofinancialregulation.
The views expressed are those of
the authors and not of their
employers. The authors are grate-
ful to all those who reviewed the
draftofthispolicybrief.
16.PublishedinFrancis
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theCrossroads,Yale
UniversityPress,2006
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